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Non-Technical Summary 
The Kyoto Protocol mandates a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to countervail climate 
change. As a consequence, the EU has introduced the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) to achieve a reduction of CO2 emissions of 21% on average among energy producers and 
energy intensive industries until 2020. The regulated firms are heterogeneous in terms of annual 
emissions levels and employed technology. Since there are currently no end-of-pipe technologies 
available for CO2 abatement, firms have to optimize processes or invent new technologies in 
many cases to achieve emission reductions. If emissions occur as a byproduct of complex 
processes as it is often the case in the EU ETS, firms will face informational costs when searching 
for abatement options or when evaluating costs for abatement. This is in contrast to other 
regulatory schemes, like the US SO2 trading scheme. Within the US SO2 trading scheme one 
specific technology was regulated, namely the combustion of fossil fuels for energy production. 
Moreover, when the SO2 trading scheme was introduced there were mature end-of-pipe 
technologies available on markets (i.e. scrubbers), offering abatement options at low 
informational costs.  
In this paper we present a model that highlights the importance of technological complexity and 
firm-size in environmental regulation. If regulated firms emit a relatively small amount of 
pollutants, possible efficiency gains from abatement are also relatively small. If there are high 
informational costs for abatement options and costs to be identified because of complex 
technology, small emitters might face a threshold for searching for abatement technology. This 
could effectively hamper the implementation of existing abatement technologies and the 
invention of new ones.  
The model presented in this paper has several implications for the optimal design of 
environmental regulation, i.e. if regulated technological processes are complex, as in the case of 
greenhouse gas abatement. Induced technological change can be hampered if regulated sources 
emit only small amounts of pollutants. The problem can be resolved if informational costs for 
abatement options and the discovery of abatement costs are reduced, e.g. by strengthening 
collaboration in research and development, fostering and incentivizing technological transfer, 
strengthening markets for abatement technologies or promoting basic research. Reducing 
uncertainty with regard to future regulation can also reduce informational costs, e.g. by 
announcing price-floors in quantity based regulation. Alternatively, smaller emitters could be 
opted-out of regulation. Further research has to be conducted with regard to the optimal mix of 
additional measures to environmental regulation in situations where a complex technology is 
employed and to the optimal coverage of firms and technology.      
 
 
 
 
 
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Zum Schutz des Weltklimas haben sich zahlreiche Staaten im Rahmen des Kyoto Protokolls dazu 
verpflichtet, ihren Ausstoß an Treibhausgasen zu senken. Dazu wurde in Europa ein 
Handelssystem für Treibausgasemissionen eingeführt. Durch das Europäische 
Emissionshandelssystem (EU EHS) soll der CO2-Ausstoß bei Energieversorgungsbetrieben und in 
der Industrie bis 2020 um 21% reduziert werden. Die im EU EHS regulierten Unternehmen sind in 
mehrfacher Hinsicht  heterogen. Zum einen unterscheiden sie sich deutlich in ihren jährlichen 
Emissionsmengen, zum anderen ist auch die verwendete Produktionstechnologie, bei deren 
Nutzung CO2-Emissionen anfallen, höchst heterogen. Da es bisher keine einfache Möglichkeit 
gibt, CO2-Emissionen zu mindern, z.B. durch nachsorgende additive Vermeidungsmaßnahmen 
(engl. end-of-pipe), müssen Vermeidungsoptionen in vielen Bereichen individuell für einzelne 
Prozesse entwickelt werden. Den regulierten Unternehmen können bei der Suche nach 
passenden Technologien zur CO2-Minderung Such- und Informationskosten entstehen. Damit 
unterscheidet sich das EU EHS von anderen Schadstoffregulierungssystemen, etwa dem US-
amerikanischen SO2-Handelssystem. Im US SO2-Handelssystem wurde im Wesentlichen nur eine 
Technologie reguliert, nämlich die Verbrennung von fossilen Rohstoffen zur Energiegewinnung. 
Zudem waren nachsorgende additive Vermeidungsmaßnahmen (insb. SO2-Waschanlagen) auf 
Märkten verfügbar.  
In diesem Aufsatz wird ein ökonomisches Modell präsentiert, das anhand eines Vergleiches  der 
oben genannten Systeme aufzeigt, welche Bedeutung technologische  Komplexität von 
Schadstoffvermeidungstechnologien und Heterogenität von regulierten Unternehmen für die 
Ausgestaltung von Schadstoffregulierungssystemen haben kann. Ein hoher Grad an 
technologischer Heterogenität kann dazu führen, dass Vermeidungstechnologien nicht in 
ausreichendem Maße durch Märkte zur Verfügung gestellt werden, insbesondere dann, wenn 
bestimmte Technologien nur von einer geringen Anzahl von regulierten Emittenten genutzt 
werden. Sind die technologischen Prozesse  komplex, so kann dies zudem zu relativ hohen Such- 
und Informationskosten für die regulierten Emittenten führen. Da regulierte Unternehmen mit 
relativ geringen Emissionsmengen im Durchschnitt auch geringere absolute Potenziale zur 
Kostensenkung aufweisen als größere Emittenten, kann es zu Situationen kommen, in denen  
Such- und Informationskosten kleinere Emittenten oder Unternehmen mit hoher technologischer 
Komplexität an der Identifikation oder Entwicklung von Vermeidungstechnologien hindern.  
Aus dem Modell leiten sich wichtige Erkenntnisse für eine optimale Regulierung von 
Schadstoffen ab, die unter komplexen technologischen Prozessen anfallen. Dies hat besondere 
Relevanz in Hinblick auf die Regulierung von Treibhausgasen. So zeigt sich, dass induzierter 
technologischer Wandel gehemmt werden kann, wenn vornehmlich kleine Emissionsquellen 
reguliert werden, die komplexe technologische Prozesse verwenden. Dem kann durch eine 
Minderung der anfallenden Such- und Informationskosten entgegengewirkt werden, etwa durch 
die Stärkung von Forschungskooperationen und Wissensaustausch, die Stärkung und 
Vernetzung von Märkten, die benötigte Technologien entwickeln und anbieten können, die 
Verringerung der Unsicherheit über zukünftige Kosten der Regulierung in einem mengenbasierten 
Regulierungssystem wie dem EU EHS oder dem Ausbau der Grundlagenforschung. Alternativ wäre 
es möglich, kleinere Emittenten aus der Regulierung auszunehmen oder anders zu regulieren. 
Weiterer Forschungsbedarf besteht noch hinsichtlich der Maßnahmen die sich optimal zur 
Flankierung bestehender Regulierungssysteme eignen (policy-mix) bzw. der Bestimmung des 
optimalen Umfangs von Regulierungssystemen.   
The Impact of Informational Costs in
Quantity Regulation of Pollutants
The Case of the European Emissions Trading Scheme
Peter Heindl
∗
Version of 8 May 2011
Abstract
There is extreme heterogeneity of ﬁrms regulated under the Eu-
ropean Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in terms of emissions
levels and employed technology. We present a model that shows that
behavior of ﬁrms under quantity regulation can diﬀer strongly, depen-
dent on the characteristics of the ﬁrms when the assumption of full
information is relaxed. If there are informational costs with regard
to abatement options and costs, relatively small emitters and emitters
with relatively complex technology will face a threshold for evaluating
abatement options and costs. We compare the EU ETS to the US
SO2 trading scheme and show that "adjoining" markets to quantity
regulation, supplying goods (i.e. abatement technology) or services
(i.e. assistance in permit trading), play a crucial role to reduce trans-
actions costs. Given high complexity of technology and/or strongly
limited demand for certain technologies, markets will fail to provide
appropriate assistance, generating eﬃciency losses. The presence of
technological complexity and heterogeneous ﬁrms can have major con-
sequences for the design of environmental regulation, when considering
transaction costs.
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1 Introduction
Firms do not have full information. Surveys among German ﬁrms in the
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which aims to reduce green-
house gas emissions in the European industry and energy sector by 21 percent
until 2020, conﬁrm this proposition. For example, it shows that 65 percent of
German ﬁrms regulated by the EU ETS did not evaluate costs and options
for greenhouse gas abatement between 2005, when the scheme started, and
2010. Most importantly, small emitters are less active in the EU ETS in
general. Among emitters that have already evaluated costs and options for
abatement, the median of emissions was 90,000 tCO2 in 2009 and hence three
times higher than among emitters that did not evaluate costs and options for
abatement. Small emitters are less active not only with regard to information
on abatement options. Among emitters with less than 25,000 tCO2 emissions
in 2009, only 50 percent actually implemented abatement in 2005 to 2010,
compared to 62 percent among larger emitters (≥ 25,000 tCO2). 60 percent
of small emitters did not trade permits, compared to 40 percent among larger
emitters. 55 percent of small emitters stated that cost minimization with re-
gard to the EU ETS is of secondary importance for their company, compared
to 33 percent among larger emitters. It shows that 98 percent of emissions,
covered in the EU ETS in Germany, stem from ﬁrms that actually aim to
minimize costs, however, the remaining two percent of emissions stem from
ﬁrms that do not primarily aim to minimize costs and seek to comply with
the EU ETS in the ﬁrst place (Detken et al, 2009; Löschel et al, 2010).
Why is that? We expect large emitters to be able to generate larger gains in
the EU ETS by optimizing processes. On the other hand, transaction costs
could hamper cost minimization among smaller emitters, implying that the
expenditures from gathering information are larger than the expected gains
from doing so. Managing carbon, hence, could depend on the initial emis-
sions level of regulated ﬁrms. Or alternatively, the eﬃcient degree of eﬀort
invested in optimizing processes under regulation could diﬀer among ﬁrms of
diﬀerent emissions level.
In addition to that, there is a technological dimension. Highly complex pro-
cesses might require more eﬀort for optimization (Matisoﬀ, 2010). This is
especially important if there are no marketable abatement options, like in the
case of greenhouse gases, where currently no end-of-pipe technology exists.
This is in strong contrast to other quantity based regulatory schemes, like the
US SO2 trading scheme. In the SO2 trading scheme there were easily avail-
able abatement options. While abatement options themselves, like scrub-
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bers, were by no means cheap, informational costs for searching appropriate
abatement options can be considered suﬃciently small. Hence, markets that
supply abatement technology or services related to trading of permits, might
highly contribute to make quantity regulation easier to manage for regulated
ﬁrms. While informational costs (or transaction costs in general) can also
occur under regulation by tax, we focus on quantity regulation because it
has become increasingly prominent for the regulation of greenhouse gases
in recent years. For example, the Kyoto protocol mandates a reduction by
quantities, the EU ETS is a quantity based scheme, New Zeeland currently
installed a quantity based greenhouse gas regulation scheme and countries
like the USA, Japan or Australia have discussed quantity approaches to reg-
ulate greenhouse gases. Moreover, it allows for comparing transaction costs
for trading of permits and the identiﬁcation of abatement options. Hence
it helps to illustrate the impact of technological complexity, which can be
regarded as variety of demanded products for abatement by regulated ﬁrms.
In this paper, we focus on informational costs for abatement, dependent on
the initial emissions level of a ﬁrm and the complexity of employed technol-
ogy. We brieﬂy discuss the general idea of quantity regulation in the next
section. In section three, we compare the EU ETS and the US SO2 trading
scheme and discuss the impact of informational costs in the EU ETS. In sec-
tion four, we present a model that tries to take these informational costs in
the behavior of ﬁrms under quantity regulation into account. In section ﬁve,
the importance of markets for environmental regulation, or more precisely
the impact of vertical vs. horizontal integration, is discussed. We ﬁnally
discuss the results and try to derive solutions for the problem of transaction
costs related to the identiﬁcation of appropriate abatement options.
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2 Standard Theory
The standard approach to quantity based regulation states that ﬁrms face a
certain price p for tradable permits on the market and equate their marginal
costs of abatement according to that price. When abatement costs are ci(e),
ﬁrm i faces the problem
min
e
Ci = ci(e) + p · ei. (1)
The ﬁrm aims to minimize total costs Ci from the quantity based regulation
which stem from the costs of abatement ci(e) and the costs for purchasing
permits at price p for each unit of emissions ei. Deriving the total costs for
e yields the optimal (cost minimizing) emissions level e∗
δCi
δe
=
δci(e)
δe
+ p.
The optimal emissions level e∗ is located where marginal abatement costs are
equal to the marginal price for emitting one unit emissions p and the ﬁrm
adjust their emissions from the initial level e0i to the optimal level e
∗ in order
to minimize costs
δCi(e)
δe
∣∣∣∣
e∗i
= p∗.
The idea of tradable permits goes back to the contributions of Coase (1960),
Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) who forulated the idea in a qualitative way
and Baumol and Oates (1971)1 and Montgomery (1972) who showed that a
scheme of tradable permits can yield an eﬃcient allocation of emissions. The
most important fact here is that each ﬁrm perceives the same price (marginal
costs per purchased permit). Thus, if each ﬁrm individually adjusts its emis-
sions according to the cost minimizing marginal condition above, marginal
abatement costs are equalized between all sources within the economy. As a
consequence there is no regulated source (ﬁrm or installation) that would be
able to abate more eﬃciently than any other. Following Weitzman (1974),
1Tietenberg points out that Baumol and Oates (1971) demonstrated formally that
the qualitative model by Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) was correctly anticipated. As
Tietenberg (2006, pp. 4-5) says: "The ﬁnal stage [...] was reached with the publications
of a couple of now classic articles. The ﬁrst, by Baumol and Oates (1971), formalized the
theory behind these practical insights for the case of uniformly mixed pollutants, those for
which only the level, not the location, of the emissions matters. This was followed shortly
by an article by Montgomery (1972) that generalized the results for the more complicated
case of non-uniformly mixed pollutants [...]".
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tradable permits can have a comparative advantage compared to regulation
by prices (tax) if and only if the slope of marginal beneﬁts from regulation
is steeper than the slope of marginal costs. With regard to environmental
eﬀectiveness it has to be said that, given a ﬁxed emissions constraint or oﬀ-
set baseline, a scheme of tradable permits is expected to deliver the targeted
amount of emissions (or emissions reduction) at least costs. This is in con-
trast to a tax scheme. Using taxes, emissions reductions can also be achieved
at least costs, but since a tax sets a ﬁxed price, the actual emissions reduction
is in practice uncertain due to a priori unknown marginal abatement costs
(see Hahn and Stavins, 1992 and Stavins, 2008).
In standard theory, there are no costs for using markets, like the market for
emissions permits or the market for abatement technology, and ﬁrms have
full information (i.e. about permit prices and the shape of the marginal
abatement costs curve). There are few papers that address transaction costs
for the case of tradable permits. Stavins (1995) and Montero (1997) focus on
issues related to permit trading. Hanemann (2009) points out that in cases
where assumptions from standard theory are relaxed, the way of allocation
of permits (free allocation vs. auctioning) can have an impact on the ﬁnal
allocation of emissions2.
Today there is a large and still growing body of literature related to organi-
zational issued in economics in general that augments classical theory. Start-
ing with Coase (1937), puzzling about the nature of the ﬁrms, over Leiben-
steins X-ineﬃciency (Leibenstein, 1966), to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and
Williamson (1979), to name a few. A common feature to all these contribu-
tions is the question of what motivates the use of markets versus the use of
hierarchies and what exactly the nature of the process of production under
coordination inside a ﬁrm is. Costs for transacting or alternatively, costs
for using markets instead of hierarchies, play an important role here. In the
next section we brieﬂy discuss the importance of markets in general and the
importance of costs for using markets in particular for the case of tradable
permits. By doing so we focus on the case of informational costs related to
abatement.
2This can be inter alia due to risk aversion of ﬁrms and because of an endowment eﬀect
on the ﬁrm level.
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3 The Role of Informational Costs
Informational costs can play an important role in determining the optimal
output under quantity regulation. In practice, ﬁrms need to gather infor-
mation and to accumulate knowledge with regard to the market for tradable
permits, abatement technologies, and other management issues related to
emissions trading. In addition, there are adjoining markets being used due
to the regulatory scheme, i.e. markets for abatement technology and ﬁnan-
cial assets like futures and options for emission permits. Informational costs
or transaction costs under regulation also depend on the state of adjoining
markets, i.e. if they are mature markets that can be easily used without
high costs of transacting. This also points out the evolutional character of
any regulatory scheme. Not only regulated ﬁrms have to adapt to a newly
installed regulatory scheme. Adjoining markets will also evolve over time or
existing markets will adapt to the new scheme (i.e. when demand for certain
goods or services, like trading of permits or abatement technology is gener-
ated through environmental regulation). Considering transaction costs under
regulation, the possibility of using markets instead of hierarchies should be
regarded as a driving force for overall eﬃciency. The basic questions are, ﬁrst,
which commodities or capabilities3 under quantity regulation demanded by
regulated ﬁrms can be traded on adjoining markets, and second, when and
why regulated ﬁrms will use markets or hierarchies to minimize costs under
quantity regulation.
Informational costs related to trading of allowances include the costs for con-
ducting certain transactions as well as evaluating the need for transactions
and their timing. Evaluating the need for transactions is necessary because
ﬁrms usually have the obligation to surrender emission permits for each com-
pliance period at a certain point in time. Hence, it must be ensured that an
adequate number of permits is available for compliance. Since permit prices
vary over time, ﬁrms have to take future costs of environmental regulation
3Such commodities or capabilities could be abatement technologies, alternative fuels
for fuel-switching or services like technical assistance or permit trading and management
by intermediaries.
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into account when investment decisions are made4. Taking the European
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as an example, installations within
the EU ETS have a lifecycle of 30 to 40 years in average (Löschel et al,
2010). When investment decisions for durable goods under regulation are
made, ﬁrms would have to take the potential regulatory costs over the whole
life cycle into account. Since there is currently high uncertainty about the
future stringency of greenhouse gas regulation under the EU ETS, informa-
tional costs with regard to a long term assessment of prices will occur and the
inclusion of a risk premium for investment under uncertainty is likely5. When
the simple examples mentioned above hold, quantity regulation under uncer-
tainty, like in the case of the EU ETS, clearly is second best, compared to
the theoretical case of full information. While this is by no means a novelty,
it nevertheless highlights the potential impact of informational costs and the
impact of uncertainty on markets that are related to regulation by quantities.
Informational costs for identifying abatement options and evaluating the re-
lated costs might in some cases be far more important than costs related to
permit trading. Comparing the SO2 trading scheme under the Clean Air Act
in the USA to the European Emissions Trading Scheme can serve as an illus-
tration here. While there were available standardized abatement technologies
under the US trading scheme for SO2, which started in 1990, there are rarely
standardized abatement options for greenhouse gas emissions available on
markets in the EU ETS. In particular, the non-availability of end-of-pipe
technologies for CO2 abatement and the limited options for replacing fossil
fuels are of great importance in the case of greenhouse gas abatement. The
most important options for SO2 abatement in the USA were coal switch-
ing (to low-sulfur coal) and the installation of scrubbers (Hanemann, 2009).
4In practice this implies the evaluation of future permit prices as well as an evaluation
of the future stringency of regulation. Within the EU ETS prices are expected to rise over
time because of the decreasing overall cap on greenhouse gases in Europe. Uncertainty
regarding the future climate policy in Europe, such as the possibility that the EU could
raise their emissions reduction target from currently 20 percent to 30 percent (greenhouse
gas reduction until 2020 compared to 1990), represents general uncertainty about regula-
tion. Both aspects, price development under existing regulation and possible changes in
future regulation, must be considered for an evaluation of future costs to be consistently
derived.
5Uncertainty played an important role in the US SO2 trading scheme. As Hahn and
Hester (1989) pointed out: "Thus, the lack of clearly quantiﬁes property rights created a
disincentive for ﬁrms to create surplus emissions reductions and to participate in emissions
trading". Although the US SO2 trading scheme and the EU-ETS diﬀer in many aspects,
existing uncertainty might hamper an eﬃcient implementation of emissions reductions and
trading activities in both schemes.
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Starting in 1990 prices for scrubbers dropped while their eﬃciency increased
(Taylor, Rubin and Hounshell, 2003; Popp, 2003). Ellerman and Monterro
(1998) and Ellerman (2003) reported that there was also an increased use of
retroﬁtted scrubbers combined with the use of higher-sulfur coal as a cost
minimizing strategy. As Burtraw (1996) and Hanemann (2009) point out,
there was competition between the suppliers of abatement options (low-sulfur
coal and scrubbers combined with the option of changing the dispatch order
of plants) which actually led to a reduction in overall abatement costs over
time.
An important feature of the SO2 trading scheme, when comparing to the EU
ETS, was the availability of marketable abatement options. As Hanemann
(2009) points out, scrubbers were a mature technology when the SO2 trading
program entered into force. Moreover, the availability of low-sulfur coal rep-
resents an abatement option through adjoining markets (not a technological
abatement option)6. The fact that there was some kind of competition be-
tween inputs helped to decrease abatement costs over time. This is a feature
of markets that are not directly related to SO2 trading, but induced through
the trading scheme. New markets evolved, like the market for scrubbers, or
existing markets were changed, like the market for coal, because of demand
generated through environmental regulation. This highlights the importance
of well-functioning adjoining markets for abatement options beyond the trad-
ing scheme per se.
In particular, the SO2 trading scheme addressed one speciﬁc industrial pro-
cess, namely coal combustion for power generation. As a consequence stan-
dardized abatement options evolved and were broadly applicable. This is
in strong contrast to the situation in the EU ETS, which covers a wide
range of diﬀerent activities, products, technologies and industrial processes
in general. The list of product benchmarks7, developed by the European
Commission as baseline for free allocation of permits after 2012, can serve as
an illustration here (EU, 2010a). It contains a list of 116 diﬀerent industrial
processes considered for the deﬁnition of benchmarks for free allocation of
permits. Consequently, it is necessary to think about quantity regulation
6As Ellerman (2003) and Hanemann (2009) point out, the US coal market changed
inter alia due to the introduction of the SO2 trading scheme. Hence, the coal market
adapted to the new situation in terms of supplying more low sulfur coal.
7The product benchmarks do not cover all relevant technologies within the EU ETS.
This is because it only considers the sectors exposed to the risk of carbon leakage (EU,
2010b) and second because the benchmarks are deﬁned as product benchmarks and not
primary as technology benchmarks.
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not primary in the way of regulated pollutants, but also in the way of ad-
dressed technologies and products. This is what the European Commission
actually does in terms of free allocation of permits in the EU ETS after 2012.
What are the consequences of large technological diversity in environmental
regulation and in quantity regulation in particular? If the range of technical
processes within a regulatory scheme is large, the complexity of the overall
scheme and the complexity of the adjoining markets for abatement technol-
ogy are also large. What is the impact of the technological complexity of
abatement on the costs for searching for abatement options and discovering
the related costs? Here the central assumption of full information, made by
standard theory, is clearly not applicable. Firms usually do not know their
abatement costs a priori when technology is complex and might face costs for
gathering information. These informational costs could potentially hamper
abatement and alter the overall eﬃciency of the regulatory scheme by partly
removing the "one price ﬁts all" property of the standard theory approach
or when ﬁrms in general refuse to examine costs because of X-ineﬃciency
(Leibenstein, 1966). X-ineﬃciency refers to a situation where ﬁrms fail to
minimize all costs due to a lack of competitive pressure or because competi-
tive pressure is not perceived by the relevant parts of a multi-person ﬁrm.8.
The decision to search for abatement options and costs and the decision to
implement abatement can be seen as two diﬀerent processes. If abatement
options and abatement costs are known, the ﬁrm will implement these op-
tions given that it is a cost minimizing strategy. If abatement options and
abatement costs are unknown, the ﬁrm will decide to search for information
if the expectation is that the gathered information will actually contribute
to cost minimization.
Given the large technological diversity in the EU ETS the next question is
whether heterogeneity in the emission intensity of regulated ﬁrms could be an
issue. Since the nature of abatement in general is incremental, meaning that
abatement options are implemented so that a shift in the emissions intensity
occurs, it is reasonable to expect small emitters to realize smaller incremental
absolute emissions reductions than larger emitters which employ the same
technology. Hence, smaller emitters might realize smaller absolute eﬃciency
8Also with regard to X-eﬃciency, the size of a ﬁrm, its overall emissions-level and the
perceived costs of regulation might be of importance. A small ﬁrm that can potentially
generate small eﬃciency gains through abatement only might not choose to evaluate costs
because of a lack of institutional or monetary pressure, i.e. when permits are allocated for
free.
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gains or absolute cost savings compared to larger emitters when implementing
abatement options to approach a cost-minimizing state of emissions, imply-
ing that initial emissions e0i are higher than cost minimizing emission e
∗
i . One
may assume that investment costs for implementing abatement options are
positively correlated with the amount of overall emissions of an installation.
On the other hand, it is not necessarily true that informational costs are
correlated with the overall amount of emissions. Informational costs could
occur as some kind of ﬁxed costs dependent on the technological complexity
of processes or the availability of abatement solutions on markets. This could
impose a threshold for searching on smaller emitters, given relatively small
potential eﬃciency gains, and, hence, hamper abatement.
Discussing the importance of informational costs, or costs for managing
abatement in general, three aspects have to be considered:
1. The magnitude of eﬃciency gains:
From standard theory it is clear that the magnitude of eﬃcient abate-
ment deﬁnes the magnitude of eﬃciency gains. When a regulatory
scheme is phased in and the initial emissions of a ﬁrm are greater
then optimal emissions (e0i > e
∗
i ), given permit price p
∗ and technol-
ogy speciﬁc marginal abatement costs, gains from abatement, based on
equation (1), are
Gi = p · (e0i − e∗i )−
e0i∫
e∗i
c′i(e)de. (2)
Deriving gains Gi for initial emissions e
0
i yields
δGi
δe0i
= p− c′(e0i ).
When e0i > e
∗
i , a higher initial emissions level e
0
i yields higher gains,
given a certain marginal abatement cost curve ci(e), deﬁned by em-
ployed production technology. Hence, small emitters might realize ab-
solute smaller gains via eﬃcient abatement compared to large emitters
employing the same technology. This would be true if emissions reduc-
tions of X percent in average would be optimal for a given technology
and initial ﬁrm speciﬁc emissions level e0i .
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Although this is an assumption that needs to be proven empirically,
it appears not to be not too restrictive. However, when modeling eﬃ-
ciency gains from approaching an optimal emissions level trough abate-
ment, it should be assured, that gains are represented in such a general
way that economics of scale, linear gains or diseconomics of scale can
be captured by the model.
2. Complexity of processes and technological heterogeneity:
The second aspect is not covered by standard theory and has been
rarely discussed in the literature to our knowledge: the complexity of
processes can inﬂuence the identiﬁcation of abatement options that are
eﬃcient from the standard theory point of view. The idea behind this
is that the more complex the production process in which emissions
occur, the more complex the implementation of abatement options.
First, because appropriate and eﬃcient measures have to be identiﬁed
and second, because changing complex processes might be relatively
costly compared to changing less complex processes.
The ﬁrst argument is related to the general idea of transaction costs, i.e.
costs for searching or informational costs, which do not occur in stan-
dard theory. The second argument is related to the nature of marginal
abatement costs. The proposition above would imply that marginal
abatement costs are higher for processes where emissions occur in a
complex process compared to simpler processes. A similar statement
was made before by Matisoﬀ (2010).
Here, the role of adjoining markets with th EU ETS is important. If
there is a highly complex process, which, for example, occurs only a
few times among the more than 10,000 installations within the EU
ETS, there might be no market that supplies abatement options to
the polluter. The polluter might in some cases rely on herself to gen-
erate abatement options or face extremely high informational costs.
In certain cases, when there is no market for abatement technology,
the ﬁrm might have to use hierarchies rather than markets to iden-
tify and generate abatement options, meaning innovating on its own9.
This could have a large impact on the degree of eﬃciency in supplying
9One example for this is the case of the development of top gas recycling in steel
production. The German government granted EUR 30.18 million of subsidies to Arcelor
Mittal Steel in Eisenhüttenstadt in 2010 for the development of a technique for separation
of CO2 from top gas (EU, 2010c). Such a special abatement technology will be hardly
supplied by adjoining markets and consequently has to be developed by the regulated ﬁrm.
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abatement options because of issues related to the division of labor,
specialization, the diversiﬁcation of risks, in terms of enjoying scale
economics, or Marshall-externalities. The technological scope of emis-
sions trading combined with considerations of adjoining markets was
rarely addressed up to now, but seems to be of great importance when
comparing the EU ETS to other quantity regulation schemes, like the
US SO2 trading program. While permits might be "marketable" be-
cause they are a standardized good, many technologies, especially some
of the technologies addressed in greenhouse gas abatement, might not
be perfectly "marketable" because of their complex nature or market
structures characterized by dual oligopoly.
3. Heterogeneity in overall emission levels:
Firms within the EU ETS are highly heterogeneous in terms of annual
emission levels. In Germany, about 50 percent of companies emited less
than 25,000 tons CO2 in 2010. These 50 percent of companies account
for roughly one percent of annual emissions covered by the ETS in Ger-
many. On the other hand, a few large companies account for about half
of annual emissions in Germany10. Within the whole EU ETS, there
were 10,221 active installations in 2010 according to the CITL11. 6,375
installations emitted less than 25,000 tCO2 in 2010, while 3,846 had
emissions of more than or equal to 25,000 tCO2 in 2010. The inequal-
ity in emissions level can be shown by plotting the Lorenz curve over
veriﬁed emission in 2010, leaving out those 642 installations that had
zero emissions in 2010 (see ﬁrgure 1). It shows, that the installations
are very uneven in their emissions levels, where the corresponding Gini
coeﬃcient is 0.87812. Is this very uneven distribution harmful?
There are concerns about market power in the literature (Hahn, 1984;
Montero, 2009). However, focusing on transaction costs or informa-
tional costs for abatement, there might be another problematic eﬀect
10The four large German energy suppliers EnBW, E.ON, RWE and Vattenfall emitted 49
percent of veriﬁed CO2 emissions covered under the European Emissions Trading Scheme
in 2010 in Germany. These four companies emitted 222 MtCO2 in 2010, where overall
emissions, covered by the trading scheme in Germany, were 454 MtCO2 in 2010.
11The Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) lists the veriﬁed emissions of
all installations covered by the EU ETS.
12The Lorenz curve and Gini coeﬃcient are calculated on the installations level and
not on the ﬁrm level. Aggregating all installations to the ﬁrm level is hardly possible for
the whole EU since the data does not uniquely identify ﬁrms. Since there are some large
ﬁrms, running many installations, the inequality is likely to rise when installations would
be aggregated on the ﬁrm level.
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Figure 1: Lorenz curve of installations covered in the EU ETS and their
veriﬁed emission in 2010
of heterogeneity, namely that small ﬁrms might face a considerable
threshold when investing in abatement. As discussed above, ﬁrms with
more complex processes might face high informational costs in gen-
eral and some might not even have the option to use markets to ﬁnd
appropriate abatement options. In such a situation there is no more
make-or-buy decision because of the non-existence of mature markets.
Small emitters that cannot realize large eﬃciency gains might back
away from investing in searching for abatement options, at least if the
expectation is that the eﬀorts will not pay-oﬀ in the end. If the proposi-
tion holds that possible gains from abatement increase with the overall
initial emissions level of a ﬁrm and that ﬁrms face transaction costs
and informational costs when searching for abatement options, then
one would expect that the ability to abate in an eﬃcient way diﬀers
between larger and smaller emitters. This means that some ﬁrms might
not invest in searching for information on abatement, and, hence, do
not abate, because of large informational costs. This could represent
a cost minimizing strategy when informational costs are considered.
However, the ﬁnal allocation of emissions and abatement between reg-
ulated ﬁrms could be diﬀerent in this case than expected by standard
theory.
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Wrapping up the discussion, it has to be said that under environmental
regulation, where we consider a scheme of tradable permits here, not only the
regulated pollutant deﬁnes the regulatory scheme. Moreover, the addressed
technologies can play a crucial role for the full costs of abatement, assuming
the existence of transaction costs (i.e. informational costs) and relaxing the
assumption of full information and perfect markets. If this is true and if
possible eﬃciency gains (cost savings) from abatement depend on the overall
emissions level of ﬁrms, then ﬁrms of relatively small initial emissions level
could face a threshold for abatement. In the next section, we specify the idea
in a more formal and more detailed way.
13
4 The Model
4.1 A Simple Approach
An easy approach to the problem of informational costs for abatement in the
EU ETS would be to assume a certain value of ﬁxed costs for information
and to compare it to the expected value of eﬃciency gains that would stem
from implementing an abatement option. The gain from implementing an
abatement option is Gi for ﬁrm i when the initial emissions level is e
0 and
the optimal emissions level is e∗, where it is assumed that e0i > e
∗
i . The ﬁrm
employs one certain technology and the permit price is p∗. Then Gi is
Gi = p
∗ · (e0i − e∗i )−
e0i∫
e∗i
c′i(e)de.
Since ﬁrm i is monitored under the trading scheme, e0i is known, p
∗ can
be observed on the market for emissions permits and is ﬁxed because we
consider a static model for simplicity. The ﬁrm is not aware of its marginal
costs of abatement c′i(e) and therefore also the optimal (cost minimizing)
amount of emissions e∗i is a priori unknown. The ﬁrm might have at least
rough expectations about the options and costs of abatement. Therefore, the
a priori expected abatement costs E(ci(e)) are the basis for a ﬁrm's decision
to search for abatement options or not. Expected gains E(Gi) are then
E(Gi) = p
∗ · (e0i − E(e∗i ))−
e0i∫
E(e∗i )
E(c′i(e))de.
If the costs for information occur once, are known by the ﬁrm (i.e. costs for
employing one person to evaluate abatement options), are dependent on the
employed technology of ﬁrm i and have a ﬁxed value CIi , then the ﬁrm can
evaluate whether it is beneﬁcial to search for abatement options and costs.
This can be easily done by comparing searching costs and expected gains. A
cost minimizing ﬁrm will choose to search for abatement options and costs
if and only if the expected gains are higher than, or equal to the expected
informational costs E(Gi) ≥ CIi . The same principle can be applied with
regard to trading of allowances, where the gains from a more sophisticated
evaluation of trading options and strategies are compared to the costs for
setting up the evaluation. Trading and searching for abatement options can
be subsumed as carbon management. The goal of such management schemes
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is to make use of markets if possible or alternatively provide goods and ser-
vices within the ﬁrms. The costs for carbon management in general can be
regarded as transaction costs.
The simple model above illustrates the possible impact of transaction costs
in environmental regulation when the assumption of full information and
perfect markets is relaxed. Here, we focus on abatement, because abatement
is more complex in the EU ETS than trading of permits. Within the US
trading schemes, abatement options were relatively easily available on mar-
kets but permit trading was relatively complex and sticky (Hahn and Hester
1989; Hanemann, 2009). Thus, it is clear that, when designing quantity reg-
ulation, it is important to minimize transaction costs so that liquid markets
for permits and abatement options can evolve (Tietenberg, 2006).
4.2 A Model With Technology and Firm-Size
From the simple model above it becomes clear that the implementation of
abatement options depends on the initial emissions level e0i which deﬁnes the
expected gain and the complexity of technology which deﬁnes the informa-
tional costs for searching and the abatement costs in general. However, the
representation above is quite simple and unsatisfactory. The model can be
easily expanded when we are willing to accept some alternative assumptions
instead of assuming full information and perfect markets that imply zero
transaction costs.
The gains Gi for ﬁrm i are dependent on the ﬁrms historical predetermined
emissions level e0i . In the following, we denote ei instead of e
0
i for simplicity,
while still referring to the initial emissions level. The gains from equation
(2) can be rewritten in a general form as
Gi(e) = γ · ezi . (3)
Here, z is a variable that deﬁnes the shape of the gain-curve of ﬁrm i de-
pendent on initial emissions ei and the employed technology γ. Since gains
are expected to rise in the initial emissions level, it implies z > 0. When
0 < z < 1 possible gains increase in e but less than e (decreasing marginal
gains), implying Gi(e)
′ > 0 and Gi(e)′′ < 0. When z = 1 there is a constant
increase of gains in e with Gi(e)
′ > 0. When z > 1 gains increase in emissions
e and rise in e (increasing marginal gains) with Gi(e)
′ > 0 and Gi(e)′′ > 0.
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In equation (3) above, γ is a shift parameter, allowing for a higher or lower
level of gains dependent on the individual marginal abatement costs of ﬁrm
i. If γ > 0 there are eﬃcient abatement options that could be implemented
by ﬁrm i. If γ = 0, gains are zero and abatement will be not considered13.
The informational costs CIi which are transaction costs for using markets or
hierarchies to ﬁnd appropriate abatement technology and identifying abate-
ment costs are dependent on the employed technology α of ﬁrm i. The reason
is simply because we expect more complex technologies to come along with
higher informational costs. Informational costs are given as
CIi (e) = α · eyi . (4)
Here y is a variable that deﬁnes the shape of the informational cost curve of
ﬁrm i with the same properties as z in Gi. The variable α is a level shift of
informational costs due to more (or less) complex technology. Here, the em-
ployed technology α deﬁnes the searching costs jointly with y. If α = 0, there
would be no informational costs and abatement options would be always im-
plemented when Gi > 0. This basically is the case of standard theory like
shown in equation (1) above. If there are informational costs, than α > 0.
The higher α, the more demanding is searching for abatement options and
the discovering of abatement costs, which we refer to as complex technology.
Informational costs are dependent on the initial emissions level e0i of ﬁrm i,
just as in the case of gains. The reason is simply because changing processes
in large facilities might in average require more information than changing
processes in small facilities given a certain technology. One example would be
a long chain of combined installations that produce greenhouse gas emissions
jointly as a byproduct as for example the case in the chemical industry or
at reﬁneries. Although each single process could be changed relatively easily
in principle, each single processes is embedded in a larger production chain.
Altering one part of the chain might often have an impact on the whole
production chain and hence requires more information. However, since in-
formational costs might not rise starkly with the initial emissions level it is
13If z = 0, gains would be equal independent of initial emissions. This case is not
considered here. Given the large heterogeneity of initial emissions levels in the European
Emissions Trading Scheme, it does not seem to be an adequate assumption that all ﬁrms
can realize equal gains, independent of initial emissions. This would actually imply that
a very small emitter could gain as much by implementing abatement as extremely large
emitters like EnBW, E.ON, RWE or Vattenfall emitting jointly nearly half of emissions
covered by the EU ETS in Germany.
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straightforward to expect y to be relatively small. In addition to that we
explicitly allow for pure ﬁx costs, implying y = 0. This is in contrast to gains
where it is assumed that 0 < z.
Now ﬁrm i decides whether to search for abatement options and identify
abatement costs or not, just like in the simple model above. Basically, the
ﬁrm will search for abatement options if Gi(e) ≥ CIi (e)14. We treat gains and
informational costs as deterministic for simplicity. However, if gains and in-
formational costs are uncertain, issues about risk aversion could further have
an impact on the implementation of abatement options15. Now can derive
the critical level of initial emissions e˜ of ﬁrm i for searching abatement op-
tions eﬃciently. Alternatively we can derive the critical level of technological
complexity α˜ given the initial emissions level e0i of ﬁrm i. Before we do so,
we brieﬂy rearrange CIi (e) and Gi(e) for convenience.
Firms are indiﬀerent whether to search or not when CIi (e) = Gi(e). Dividing
the equation by γ yields
α
γ
· eyi = ezi
a · eyi = ezi . (5)
Redeﬁning α/γ = a decreases complexity in the next steps. Here, a is the
technological complexity (α) per unit gain (γ). This implies that high gains
can potentially compensate for high technological complexity. However, the
feasibility of the implementation of abatement still depends on the initial
emissions level and technological complexity of ﬁrm i.
Resolving (5) for e and a yields the critical initial emissions level e˜ where
searching for abatement options pays for ﬁrm i and the critical technological
level a˜ that must not be exceeded for searching to pay
14Although we consider a static model with one time period, informational costs CIi (e)
can also be regarded as annualized costs for information. This could be relevant in practice
when ﬁrms have to re-evaluate abatement options and costs from time to time.
15Risk aversion can either have a positive or negative impact. When a ﬁrm is risk-avers
against investing in searching it will hamper abatement. When a ﬁrm is risk-avers in the
sense that it fears high permit prices it probably will abate even under limited information.
Sandoﬀ and Schaad (2009) ﬁnd some evidence for diﬀering strategies of ﬁrms in the EU
ETS.
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e˜ = a−
1
y−z (6)
a˜ = e−y+z. (7)
The critical initial emissions level e˜ is dependent on a and the critical techno-
logical complexity a˜ is dependent on e. The results imply that given a certain
technology and gain structure α/γ = a there is a threshold for searching for
abatement options and discovering abatement costs. The critical levels are
also deﬁned by the distance between y and z. When the absolute value of
y − z gets smaller, e˜ rises and a˜ falls.
The ﬁrst derivations of (6) and (7) are:
δe˜
δa
= −a
− 1
y−z−1
y − z (8)
δa˜
δe
= (−y + z) · e−y+z−1. (9)
If y < z, the ﬁrst derivations are positive implying that the critical emissions
level e˜ rises in a and the critical technological level a˜ rises with the initial
emissions level e0i of ﬁrm i respectively. This implies that the more complex
technological processes, the higher the threshold for searching for abatement
options and costs. Alternatively it can be said that the more complex the
employed technology, the higher the initial emissions must be (and hence po-
tential gains) so that it is a cost minimizing strategy to search for abatement
options and costs.
It is necessary here to restrict the parameters to y < z, implying that in-
formational costs rise less in emissions than gains. This is by no means a
restrictive assumption because if informational costs exceed gains in prin-
ciple, then no ﬁrm would abate. In contrast, informational costs can be
expected to be nearly ﬁxed-costs, only slightly rising in emissions, implying
a relatively small value of y. Standard theory expects informational costs to
be zero or at least close to zero because of full information or nearly full in-
formation, also implying perfect markets for abatement technology that can
be used at zero costs. Removing the assumption of full information and per-
fect markets does not necessarily imply extremely high informational costs.
To adjust informational costs to diﬀerent situation we introduced "technical
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complexity", however, for abatement options to be implemented at all in the
presence of informational costs, these costs must be modest in most situa-
tions, implying y < z.
z y γ α a
Shape of Shape of Level of Level of Ratio of
gain-curve cost-curve gain-curve cost-curve complexity
0 < z 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 0 < γ 0 ≤ α =α/γ
where z > y
Table 1: Overview of variables in the model
Figure 2 illustrates the model by showing the critical emissions level e˜ de-
pendent on z and the technical complexity a = α/γ, where it is assumed
that y = 0.2 . As the ﬁgure shows, the critical initial emissions level e˜ rises
starkly when z approaches y and when a rises. When z is close to y it implies
that the gain curve and the informational costs curve are very close to each
other. Consequently, relatively low gains compared to informational costs
induce a rising initial emissions level e˜. When a = α/γ rises, it implies that
technological complexity is large compared to gains and, hence, the critical
initial emissions level e˜ rises. The lines in the ﬁgure mark the points where
z = 1 and α = 1. Where a < 1, the technological complexity is uncriti-
cal and searching for abatement options and costs is nearly always feasible
from a transaction costs point of view. Where z < 1, gains rise in emissions
but marginal gains decrease, z = 1 represents linear gains and z > 1 would
imply increasing marginal gains. Especially when a > 1 and z < 1, trans-
action costs play an important role for the feasibility of abatement. It is
reasonable to expect marginal gains that decrease in initial emissions (z < 1)
or be nearly linear (z ≈ 1) rather than strongly increasing marginal gains.
Hence, technological complexity might in fact pose a threshold to abatement
to many small emitters when technological processes are complex.
The concept of technological complexity a = α/γ is twofold here. On the one
hand, technological complexity of course is related to the costs for abatement
technology. However, if there is a certain applicable abatement technology
available, the costs that represent the pure technological complexity are cap-
tured by marginal abatement costs and, hence, might have an impact on γ
rather than on α. High abatement costs would have an impact on possible
gains and, hence, lower γ, while low costs might lead to a high γ. A low γ
(high costs) leads to an increasing a et vice versa, because of δa/δγ < 0. On
the other hand, α refers to the marketability of abatement technologies, as
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Figure 2: The critical emissions level e˜, dependent on z and a
illustrated for the case of the US SO2 trading program. If technologies are
not traded on markets and ﬁrms rely on themselves to invent or innovate,
or if the market for technology is imperfect, then α might be large. We ex-
pect the markets for technology to be dependent on overall demand. Overall
emissions within one technology Ei can serve as a proxi for demand, where
Ei =
∑n
i=1 ei. Marketability of technology rises in Ei, implying δαi/δEi < 0
and hence, lowers the overall complexity a of the abatement technology be-
cause of δa/δαi > 0.
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5 A Note on "Adjoining Markets"
It is unusual to use physical models in social science . However, the way how
adjoining markets in an regulatory scheme evolve can probably be described
in the sense of gravity. If there is a large possible demand for a certain good
or service that stems from regulation, there will be intermediaries to provide
those goods or services. The general expectation in economics is that incum-
bent intermediaries enter the market until marginal revenues from entering
the market are zero. In the case of services related to permit trading, inter-
mediaries have to provide one speciﬁc service, namely selling or purchasing
of permits for their clients. Since all ﬁrms use the same permits, the service
provided by ﬁnancial intermediaries for trading is of relatively low complex-
ity and it is likely that a mature adjoining market for permit trading will
evolve due to high demand. This is why informational costs play a minor
role in trading when there is a lively and transparent exchange of permits as
it is expected to be the case in the European Emissions Trading Scheme.
While each ﬁrm uses the same kind of good in permit trading (i.e. one kind
of permit), there is a large variety of employed production technologies in
the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Some technological processes oc-
cur relatively often while others are highly speciﬁc and seldom employed.
If one certain technology is used by a large number of ﬁrms, demand for
abatement technology might be relatively large and intermediaries will en-
ter the market. If there is a large number of intermediaries, specialization
among intermediaries and competition between them will occur. Induced
by the relatively large demand for abatement technology, various goods and
services can be provided, generating a mature market for abatement tech-
nology. Thus, technical change is induced by the regulatory scheme. The
existence of adjoining markets and the size of adjoining markets is crucial
for specialization and competition in supplying alternative technologies (or
abatement technologies) for production. Speaking in terms of gravity, a large
demand for abatement technology for one certain production process a1 will
induce a large market to provide these abatement technologies, just like large
mass will yield relatively high gravity. In contrast, if there is only a small
potential demand for abatement technology for another certain production
process a2, the adjoining markets (or number of intermediaries) to provide
these abatement technologies will be relatively small and less specialized,
just like small mass yields relatively small gravity. The reason is simply be-
cause marginal revenues of intermediaries can be expected to approach zero
much faster when overall demand is low. As a consequence, the optimal num-
ber of participants in adjoining markets (intermediaries supplying abatement
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technology) would be relatively small and specialization occurs to a smaller
extent. This implies a less eﬃcient provision of technological solutions on the
supply side and higher informational costs on the demand side for abatement
technology.
As an example, one could think about the development of a end-of-pipe tech-
nology in fossil fuel combustion, namely Carbon Capture and Sequestration
(CCS). While CCS can be considered an extremely complex technology, there
is also a potential high demand, given that the European Emissions Trading
Scheme covers extremely large coal combustion installations. Large emitters,
like RWE, BASF or Linde developed a joint research project on CCS. RWE
for example tries to capture CO2 from brown coal combustion and is cur-
rently testing CCS at a coal combustion plant in Hürth (Germany). This
illustrates, that technological complexity is less important when potential
gains are large. However, a complex technology like CCS and its related
problems, like how and where to store CO2, would most likely not be feasible
if the value at stake were not millions of tons of CO2 emissions, like in the
case of RWE16.
16RWE emitted some 104 MtCO2 in 2010. This is about 23 percent of overall emission
in Germany covered by the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Assuming a permit price
of EUR 15, RWE's emissions in 2010 are "worth" more than EUR 1.5 billion.
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6 Discussion
By comparing the US SO2 trading scheme to the European Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme it becomes clear that the complexity of technology can play an
important role in environmental regulation. Hence, regulatory schemes are
not only determined by the regulated pollutant, but also by the technology
that is applicable in abatement. When the assumption of full information
and perfect markets for abatement technology are relaxed and transaction
costs (i.e. informational costs) are considered, we can see that the initial
emissions level of a regulated ﬁrm can inﬂuence the ﬁrm's ability to search
for abatement options and the related costs.
While trading of allowances appeared to be relatively "complex" in the US
SO2 trading scheme because of imperfect property rights and high uncer-
tainty, trading appears to be of relatively low complexity in the EU ETS. In
contrast, abatement was relatively easily applicable in the US SO2 trading
scheme because all regulated ﬁrms used similar technology, namely the com-
bustion of coal for energy production. Abatement technology like scrubbers
or abatement options via markets like coal switching were easily available.
However, in the EU ETS there is a large number of diﬀerent, partly very
speciﬁc processes. As a consequence, implementing abatement appears to
be associated with relatively high costs for searching or transacting for some
regulated ﬁrms. Moreover, some abatement technologies, like Carbon Cap-
ture and Sequestration (CCS) must be developed, pushing ﬁrms to invent
abatement technologies themselves. Such inventions can hardly be carried
out by very small emitters.
The model shows that, given a certain structure of potential gains and in-
formational costs under regulation, small emitters will face a threshold for
abatement if their employed technology is complex and abatement options
are not traded on markets. This underlines the importance of "adjoining
markets", especially for small emitters. Some abatement technologies can
be provided in horizontal integration, e.g. in the case of the extremely large
emitter RWE, which is developing an end-of-pipe technology to capture CO2
for coal combustion. In contrast, processes used by several small emitters
would require vertical integration of the market for abatement technology. If
there is suﬃcient demand, implying a large number of small emitter, employ-
ing the same technology and demanding similar abatement options, markets
will be able to provide these abatement options and informational costs will
be modest. However, if there are only a few small emitters employing one
certain process, informational costs could be large due to a small market for
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abatement technology or due to fractioned markets. These might provide
technology that could be applied for abatement, but do not deliver a ﬁnal
abatement technology, requiring ﬁrms to assemble the ﬁnal abatement tech-
nology themselves.
While the environmental eﬀectiveness of the quantity based regulation is en-
sured if the emissions constraint ("cap") is ensured, the next question is how
such a situation would inﬂuence economic eﬃciency. Informational costs that
hamper abatement would then prevent the implementation of theoretically
eﬃcient abatement options among small emitters with highly complex pro-
cesses. This would yield a situation where the "one price ﬁts all" assumption
of standard theory does not hold and eﬀectively economic eﬃciency will be
decreased compared to a situation without informational costs. However, the
degree of ineﬃciency can be considered small given that small emitters have
a small share on overall emissions within the regulatory scheme. In the Ger-
man part of the European Emissions Trading Scheme for example, roughly
one percent of emissions stem from approximately 50 percent of ﬁrms. While
the number of potentially "inactive" ﬁrms is large, their potentials to con-
tribute to ineﬃciency within the regulatory scheme is low.
Since potential ineﬃcient emissions levels (e0i 6= e∗i ) are persistent over time
and additional costs, i.e. for additional permit purchases, occur each compli-
ance period, it is surely reasonable to "invest" in an evaluation of abatement
options. Why should ﬁrms not do so? One option is that ﬁrms could expect
informational costs to decrease over time. This would imply that they expect
markets for their required abatement technology to evolve or technological
complexity to decrease in general, i.e. by a backstop technology to occur.
Another option would be X-ineﬃciency, implying that a ﬁrm does not prop-
erly manage the trading scheme internally. Here, free allocation could play
a crucial role. Small emitters with low potential gains will also have low
potential gains in trading of allowances and hence will tend to neglect op-
portunity costs form freely allocated permits. This underlines the interplay
of information inside a ﬁrm, capabilities, activities and transaction costs in
trading, and abatement eﬀorts. In general, it can be expected that ﬁrms will
"discover" their abatement costs over time. The model presented here must
be seen in that light. It does not necessarily imply that small emitters with
complex processes will never gather information on abatement costs and op-
tions. What it does imply in its static framework, is that small emitters with
complex processes will behave more sticky, adapt less quickly or frequently
to new situations. This would also imply that frequent changes in the policy
design or considerable volatility in the permit price could have negative im-
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pacts on small emitters.
What are potential solutions to these problems? One solution would be to
choose strict upstream regulation if possible. This would implicitly pose a
price also on small emitters, i.e. by charging fuel or other inputs. This will
in most cases not change the problem of informational costs related to abate-
ment, however, it releases small emitters from the duty of directly complying
with the regulatory scheme. In addition, the management of a small emitter
will not have to consider the permit price separately and manage permits.
Prices are (in the best case) reﬂected in inputs and, hence, directly enter the
production decision. In contrast, if a small emitter is regulated directly, it
has to consider the permit price in addition to all other inputs. This might
increase the overall complexity of regulation from the small emitter's point
of view, i.e. when pollutants occur as a complex byproduct.
A tax would be a clear and reliable price signal for polluters. While a tax
will not help to reduce informational costs with regard to abatement it nev-
ertheless could reduce the complexity of regulation in some cases. Most
importantly, the evaluation of possible future costs from regulation would be
easier in many cases because under a tax there is no price volatility like in
the case of tradeable permits. In general, there would be no need to manage
permits, making the regulatory scheme easier to manage for small emitters.
Since ﬁrms are used to the concept of taxes, but not necessarily to the con-
cept of tradeable permits, the price per unit emissions might be perceived
more directly, especially compared to free allocation of permits.
Another solution to the problem of transaction costs for small emitters would
be an exclusion of small emitters, which had been proposed earlier for quan-
tity based greenhouse gas regulation schemes in the USA or Australia and
which will be possible for the European Emissions Trading Scheme from 2013
onwards17. While opting-out smaller emitter can be expected to have a rel-
atively small impact on environmental eﬀectiveness in the EU ETS, it could
potentially increase economic eﬃciency. On the other hand, opting-out cer-
tain ﬁrms or installations would rise fairness issues, set perverse incentives
for emitters and weaken the overall acceptance of the regulatory scheme.
Based on the model the threshold emissions-level for opting-out ﬁrms dif-
fers between employed technologies. As an alternative to excluding ﬁrms or
17In the American Power Act and the proposal for the Australian Carbon Emissions
Reduction Scheme, smaller emitters were excluded from regulation. In the EU, member
states have the possibility to opt-out smaller installations of the European Emissions
Trading Scheme if they are subject to adequate alternative regulation.
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opting-out ﬁrms, small emitters could be opted-in to environmental regula-
tion after a certain period of time. I.e. when larger emitters have developed
abatement technologies and adjoining markets have involved.
Since the level of gains is dependent on the permit price, introducing a ﬂoor-
price for permits, e.g. starting after a phase-in period, could strongly in-
centivize emitters to examine costs and options for abatement more accu-
rately. Such a mixed approach of quantity and price based regulation would
actually decrease uncertainty with regard to future prices within the regu-
latory scheme. In the presence of considerable informational costs, a mixed
approach could help to increase eﬃciency by shifting possible gains from
abatement upward (via the ﬂoor-price) and, hence, decreasing the role of
informational costs compared to gains.
Alternatively, if informational costs were extremely large and by that were
hampering the examination of abatement options in general or preventing
private action, the generation and provision of abatement options could be
regarded as a public good. This could be the case when radical inventions
that require basic research are necessary. One example would be the case
of a backstop technology that is able to replace fossil fuels with other fuels
that do not release greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. With regard to
greenhouse gas abatement this could be the case for many aspects, possibly
implying revenue rising policies, if revenues are partly recycled to promote
basic research on alternative technologies.
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